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Introduction
　Since the financial collapse in 2008, accounting 
standards have received much criticism. Yet, mar-
ket regulators seem to be reluctant to propose al-
ternatives despite the need to restore confidence 
in accounting1. Some authors （Aglietta and Rebéri-
oux, 2004; Burlaud and Colasse, 2010） emphasize the 
weaknesses of global governance in accounting 
regulation, which is concentrated among a too little 
number of actors, obviously excluding many stake-
holders.
　In this regard, Burlaud and Colasse （2010） argue 
that the International Accounting Standards Board 
（IASB） may lack political legitimacy since its stan-
dard setting process tends to minimize the view-
points of stakeholders that are not represented in 
the board. For example, despite most preparers 
had sent negative comments during the due proc-
ess, compulsory disclosure of comprehensive in-
come was adopted after the revision of IAS 1 in 
2007 （Le Manh, 2009）. Even after more than ten 
years of moderate leadership in global standard 
setting, the legitimacy of the IASB is now put into 
question, especially in countries that are consider-
ing whether adopting IFRS or not, like the US and 
Japan2.
　In this context, it is interesting to investigate an 
alternative model: representative standard setting 
bodies, and in particular how the socio-professional 
representation of stakeholders contributes to their 
legitimacy. The representation of stakeholders con-
sists in providing seats to the representatives of 
various socio-professional groups so that they can 
participate directly to the debates in the standard 
setting process. Doing so, the representatives are 
able to share information and to defend the inter-
ests of their social group more easily.
　In this study, I focus on the French Accounting 
Standard Authority （Autorité des normes comptables; 
ANC） and on the Accounting Standards Board of 
Japan （ASBJ） in order to analyze the role of repre-
sentation in the domestic standard setting process. 
Germany could be another interesting case, since 
the German Accounting Standards Board （GASB） 
is also a representative body. Yet, I leave this third 
case for further research.
　This research adopts the theory of legitimacy of 
accounting standard setters （especially as defined in 
Burlaud and Colasse, 2010） and the concept of repre-
sentation in standard setting （Colasse, 2005） as a 
theoretical framework （part I）. The research meth-
od used to investigate stakeholderʼs representation 
in the ANC and ASBJ consists in analyzing the so-
cio-professional composition of the standard set-
ting body, how members are appointed and the sta-
bility of this composition （parts II and III）. Last, I 
conclude about how socio-professional representa-
tion is used to support the legitimacy of the stan-
dard setters based on the framework of Burlaud 
and Colasse （2010） （part IV）.
I　Theoretical Framework and Research 
Design
　This study focuses on socio-professional repre-
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sentation in accounting standard setting as a 
means of providing more legitimacy to the stan-
dards. In this regard, standard setting is seen as a 
political process in which the competing interests 
of several stakeholders must be adjusted.
　The following paragraphs introduce some prior 
research about legitimacy and representation in 
accounting standard setting and present the meth-
od and objectives of the study.
1　Why Do Independent Standard Setters Face 
Legitimacy Issues?
　Accounting regulation can be defined as the 
“process of production, enforcement and imple-
mentation of accounting standards” （Colasse, 2005, 
p38）. A large amount of literature has focused on 
the political dimension of this process, especially 
lobbying, defined by Sutton （1984） as the efforts 
made by interested parties in the standard setting 
process in order to promote or to oppose new ac-
counting rules.
　Lobbying is generally presented negatively since 
it tends to promote the interests of certain groups 
to the detriment of the others. In order to avoid ac-
counting regulation being dominated by a lobby, 
some national regulators3 choose to delegate stan-
dard setting to a private independent body that en-
sures the neutrality of accounting standards （if 
any）.
　As Colasse （2005, p35） analyzed based on West-
ern countries, these standard setting bodies can be 
“technocratic” （ex: FASB4） or “representative” （ex: 
ANC）. In the representative view, the independent 
body can be seen as a partnership made of the rep-
resentatives of several parties, including the State 
and the accounting profession. On the contrary, a 
technocratic body is composed of independent5 
highly-skilled specialists that do not represent the 
interests of any stakeholder. Of course, both types 
of standard setters are composed of accounting 
specialists, but the difference lies in whether they 
represent or not the interests of a social group.
　Although the members of a representative stan-
dard setting body are not usually independent— 
since they represent a social group—the standard 
setting body itself may be independent. For exam-
ple, the Diet is composed of representatives from 
different parties and regions, but it is an indepen-
dent body since it is not formally controlled by any 
of the social groups represented. Similarly, the 
ASBJ is composed of several professions, but none 
of them is strong enough to control the standard 
setting body.
　As noted in Burlaud and Colasse （2010, p.2）, in-
dependent standard setting bodies like the IASB 
face huge legitimacy problems because they usual-
ly have no legal power to enforce their own stan-
dards, so that they rely on local public regulators. 
As a result, the IASB, for example, is often re-
proached with lacking independence from both the 
EU and the U.S. （depending on the geographic origin 
of the criticism）.
　As legitimacy in accounting standard setting is a 
complex issue, various aspects of the concept have 
been highlighted in prior literature. Yet, as the le-
gal enforcement of accounting in code law coun-
tries and in common law countries is different, I 
chose to refer for this study to the analysis of Bur-
laud and Colasse （2010）.
　In Burlaud and Colasse （2010, pp. 2-3）, three 
sources of legitimacy are defined: political （which 
results directly or indirectly from elections）, process-
based （based on procedures that ensure the neutrality 
and independence of decisions） and technical （based 
on technical or scientific expertise of its members）. 
Some standard setting bodies may combine all 
three sources of legitimacy at the same time, but in 
most cases they rely mainly on one or two types.
　“Technocratic” standard setting bodies mostly 
rely on process-based and technical legitimacy. Yet, 
they lack the political component since their mem-
bers are not representatives. On the contrary, rep-
resentative bodies rely more on their political and 
technical legitimacy, and less on standard setting 
processes, even if they often proceed to public con-
sultations （Burlaud and Colasse, 2010）.
　Burlaud and Colasse （2010, p8） provided an anal-
ysis of the sources of legitimacy of the IASB. They 
put into question its process-based legitimacy, 
since many stakeholders do not have the technical 
resources to analyze the exposure-drafts. Even the 
opinions of preparers that are able to mobilize 
31
Rikkyo Business Review, No.5 （2012）　29-39
more resources are often neglected （for example 
against comprehensive income in IAS 1, Le Manh, 
2009）. They also criticize the lack of technical legit-
imacy of the IASB: it does not investigate informa-
tion needs of users before setting the standards, 
and its conceptual framework is implicitly based on 
unrealistic assumptions like the efficient markets 
hypothesis which eventually results in a deficit of 
market regulation. According to Burlaud and Co-
lasse （2010）, the consequence is the lack of legiti-
macy of the IASB.
　The response to this problem would be to rely 
more on political representation, concretely more 
supervision of the boardʼs activity by representa-
tives of interested parties （Burlaud and Colasse, 
2010, also in the Marteau-Morand Report to the French 
Ministry of Economy, 2009, p.15）.
　As a matter of fact, the composition of the IASB 
now includes some requirements concerning the 
geographical origin of board members but they are 
not of ficially representing the interests of their 
country. For this reason, the IASB can be consid-
ered as a purely technocratic standard setter6. On 
the contrary, some national standard setters tend 
to rely more on political legitimacy through a di-
rect representation of stakeholders in the account-
ing standard setting process.
2　The Representation of Stakeholders in Stan-
dard Setting
　Accounting standard setting is a matter of eco-
nomic regulation: for financial markets, of course, 
but also for tax purpose or for the execution of a 
wide range of private contracts. In this regard, all 
contractual stakeholders of a company have a fi-
nancial interest in the determination of accounting 
aggregates like profit or net assets. For example, 
shareholdersʼ dividends are voted based on earn-
ings, just like tax and sometimes bonuses for em-
ployees or executives. These interests are conflict-
ing with those of creditors, including banks and 
suppliers, for whom dividends, tax, and bonuses 
paid reduce the cash available to pay debts back.
　Colasse （2005） showed how several types of 
standard setting bodies were developed in order to 
provide a fair solution to these conflicts of inter-
ests. On the one hand, some countries chose to en-
trust standard setting to the accounting profession, 
as the most neutral and qualified actors to take de-
cisions about accounting. On the other hand, some 
countries chose to privilege a democratic process 
of decision making by gathering interested parties 
and let them discuss accounting standards directly.
　Nowadays, most standard setters are indepen-
dent bodies, but the two primitive models defined 
above still influence the current characteristics of 
domestic standard setters. For example, some na-
tional standard setting bodies were reshaped as in-
dependent entities under the model of the IASB, 
like the GASB and the ASBJ in 2001. Both institu-
tions are mainly financed by the private sector, and 
they are formally independent from the accounting 
profession and the State. Nevertheless, they have 
kept some of their original characteristics.
　In these two standard setters, there is no official 
representation of stakeholders; yet, members are 
appointed based on their socio-professional back-
ground, resulting in more diversity than in the 
original model of the IASB7. In the German case, 
such diversity already existed before the reform of 
the GASB in 2001（McLeay et al., 2000）.
　Since its creation in 2001, the ASBJ did not re-
ceive much attention in accounting literature. 
Technically, the ASBJ falls into the category of 
“technocratic” bodies in the classification of Colas-
se （2005）, since there is no official representation 
of stakeholders. Nonetheless, this case shows that 
various socio-professional profiles are involved in 
standard setting, suggesting that Japan may be an 
interesting case to investigate informal representa-
tion in accounting regulation.
　On the contrary, the French ANC is a classical 
example of explicitly representative standard set-
ters （Colasse, 2005）. The ANC was reformed in 
2007-2009 in order to provide more autonomy from 
the State and more flexibility in accounting stan-
dard setting （Colasse and Pochet, 2009）. Officially, 
the organism is independent, but the State still 
keeps an eye on standard setting: the ANC is a 
public juridical person financed with public funds 
and composed by half of representatives and half 
of independent specialists.
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　In this regard, the standard setting process and 
the composition of the board （college） are not con-
trolled by the State, but its interests are officially 
represented like those of other stakeholders. Un-
like the ASBJ, the composition of the ANC is offi-
cial and stable in time. In the classification of Co-
lasse （2005）, the ANC falls with no doubt into the 
category of “representative” independent standard 
setting bodies.
　In these examples, the diversity of the members 
appears to result from a long tradition of standard 
setting based on discussion between interested 
parties （Colasse and Pochet, 2009, Mc Leay et al., 
2000）. On the contrary, the original model of stan-
dard setting in the Anglo-Saxon tradition （histori-
cally, in Great Britain） relied exclusively on the ac-
counting profession （Colasse, 2005, p. 34）. Later, 
Anglo-Saxon standard setting bodies became inde-
pendent from the accounting profession, but most 
of them are still mainly composed of accountants.
　This phenomenon of path dependency in the 
composition of standard setting bodies is not only 
a sociological matter, but also an issue of lawmak-
ing （Colasse, 2005）. In a context of dominant “soft 
law8”, the professional expertise of accountants is 
enough to legitimate accounting practices and ac-
counting standards.
　On the contrary, in a context of “hard law”, ac-
counting rules need to be codified as a part of the 
legal system in order to be legitimate—or better, 
authoritative—-for a commercial or fiscal court. 
Accounting standards are then embedded in the le-
gal requirements that they contribute to fulfill, like 
tax, dividend or other legal commitments to third 
parties. For this reason, the stakeholders con-
cerned are legitimately represented in the stan-
dard setting process9.
　Consequently, in a code law context, accounting 
regulation made exclusively by the accounting pro-
fession lacks legitimacy—unless a public regulator 
provides this legitimacy by endorsing the stan-
dards. It would not be surprising, then, if the com-
position of standard setting bodies in code law 
countries differed from that in common law coun-
tries.
　This corresponds, in the framework of Burlaud 
and Colasse （2010）, to the need for political legiti-
macy of the standards. The underlying way of 
thinking is basically that, just like laws are normal-
ly voted by the Parliament, composed of the peopleʼs 
representatives, accounting rules should be voted 
by a standard setter also composed of stakehold-
ersʼ representatives.
3　Research Design
　The objective of this research is to investigate 
how the representation of stakeholders in account-
ing standard setting contributes to the legitimacy 
of standards. In this purpose, the theory of political 
legitimacy （Burlaud and Colasse, 2010） and the ideal 
type of representative standard setter （Colasse, 
2005） introduced above are used to analyze the 
ANC and the ASBJ.
　Several reasons tend to support the choice of the 
ANC as a representative standard setter. First, sev-
eral studies （Colasse and Standish, 1998; Colasse and 
Pochet, 2009） have already analyzed the French 
standard setter as a representative body and pro-
vide great detail about the reasons for adopting 
this structure. Moreover, independently from prior 
research, the ANC is an unambiguous case since 
its composition and the role of its members is ex-
plicitly defined by law.
　As far as the ASBJ is concerned, any reference 
to its representative nature is completely absent 
from prior literature. The study by McKinnon 
（1986） underlined that the predecessor of the 
ASBJ10  was composed mainly of academics, but 
that standard setting was dominated by State bu-
reaucracy, acting as a coordinator for private inter-
ests. Since then, the composition of the standard 
setter has completely changed, but its decision 
making appears to remain very consensual.
　The ASBJ is not officially a representative body; 
thatʼs why this case is less transparent than the 
ANC. Yet, the choice of the ASBJ can be justified 
by the diversity of the socio-professional back-
grounds of its members. Moreover, as little has 
been written about this organism, this study pro-
vides an original contribution for a better under-
standing of Japanese standard setting.
　The research method is based on analyzing the 
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socio-professional origin of the members that form 
the ASBJ and the ANC, how these members are 
appointed, and if the composition of the standard 
setter is stable in time.
　For the French case, a documentary review is 
enough to complete prior literature, but for the 
Japanese standard setter, most elements are im-
plicit and there is no prior study available. For that 
reason, the documentary review must be complet-
ed with an interview of the former Chairman of the 
ASBJ, S. Saito. This interview was necessary in or-
der to explicit how the members of the ASBJ are 
appointed and according to which criteria they are 
chosen.
　This documentary review, completed with the 
interview of S. Saito, provides the material for com-
paring the role of representation in the two stan-
dard setters.
　In the following paragraphs, I compare the Japa-
nese and the French standard setters in order to 
identify the socio-professional groups that are in-
volved in accounting regulation. The ANC provides 
the example of a formal representation system, 
which is easy to analyze; the ASBJ suggests a form 
of informal representation, which is confirmed by 
the interview of the chairman.
II　Stakeholders’ Representation in the 
French Standard Setter
1　The ANC: A Collegial Regulator
　According to Colasse （2005） and Colasse and 
Pochet （2009）, the ANC, created in 2007, and for-
merly its predecessor the CNC （Conseil national de 
la comptabilité） are based on a collegial standard 
setting process. The objective is to allow various 
stakeholders to take part directly to the discus-
sions in early stages of the process. In this pur-
pose, a wide range of accounting stakeholders is 
represented in the ANC.
　The two main commissions of the ANC are the 
board （college） that votes the standards, and the 
consultative committee （comité consultatif） that ex-
presses opinions about the activity of the board, 
but that does not take part directly in decision 
making.
　Officially, the ANC is independent from the Min-
istry of Finance, but its budget and the appoint-
ment of members are placed under its authority. 
To be precise, members are appointed by ministe-
rial order based on the suggestion of interested 
parties. For example, if a member is appointed af-
ter the proposal of the French Securities and Ex-
change Commission （Autorité des marches finan-
ciers; AMF）, the ministerial order will state: “Mr. X, 
appointed as a representative of the AMF”... In this 
regard, there is no ambiguity about the composi-
tion of the ANC.
2　Composition of the ANC
　The composition of the ANC is governed by a 
decree （Décret n° 2007-629 du 27 avril 2007 relatif au 
Conseil national de la comptabilité）. The board is 
composed of sixteen members as below.
　Composition of the ANC:
——— a member of the council of state （high-
est administrative court, ruling tax issues）;
——— a member of the final court of appeal 
（cour de cassation） designated by its president 
（highest commercial court）;
——— a member of the national audit office 
（cour des comptes） designated by its presi-
dent;
——— a representative of the Autorité des 
marches financiers （French SEC） designated 
by its President;
——— a representative of the banking com-
mission designated by its President;
——— a representative of the authority of 
control of insurance designated by its Presi-
dent; 
——— nine persons designated by the Minis-
try of Finance for their technical expertise 
in the field of economics and accounting af-
ter consultation of organizations representing 
the interests of enterprises and the accounting 
profession;
——— a representative of trade unions desig-
nated by the Finance Minister after consul-
tation of trade unions;
——— the head of public finance （gouverneur 
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général du Trésor） that attends to the ANC 
meetings but has no voting right.
　The chairman of the ANC is designated by the 
Ministry among the nine “qualified experts” above. 
For example, J. Haas, the current chairman, is a 
former civil servant from the tax administration 
and his predecessor J. F. Lepetit was a banker.
　French accounting regulation is embedded in 
several layers of legal requirements which require 
accounting rules to be consistent with commercial, 
tax and civil law. For this reason, the Board in-
cludes two representatives of courts （civil and pri-
vate）.The State is also represented through the na-
tional audit office, and some of the nine qualified 
experts also belong to public administrations like 
the chairman J. Haas.
　Besides, since domestic standards are still used 
by listed companies for individual accounts and for 
entities listed on unregulated markets, the AMF is 
also interested in domestic accounting regulation.
　Insurance and banking have their own represen-
tatives because of the specificity of their business 
and of their accounting rules. These two activities 
are regulated strictly by sector authorities so that 
accounting standards must be consistent with oth-
er legal requirements.
　A French particularity is that trade unions are 
represented in the ANC. This point can be seen as 
a legacy of the French post-war socialist tradition, 
in which employees are considered as important 
users of financial information. French standards 
still require to disclose an income statement by na-
ture in order to show explicitly the amounts of add-
ed value and personnel expenses.
　Last, the nine qualified specialist have an ambig-
uous status: they are designated after consultation 
of the accounting profession and enterprises, 
which means that they are representatives. Yet, 
they are chosen for their technical expertise which 
suggests that their role is to reinforce the “techni-
cal legitimacy” of the ANC （as defined in Burlaud 
and Colasse, 2010）. As far as other members are all 
supposed to be experts in accounting, their status 
could reasonably be interpreted as a flexible repre-
sentation of accounting practitioners, as opposed 
to the strict representation of other stakeholders.
3　Official and Stable Representation in the ANC
　To conclude about the ANC, its official composi-
tion is stable by decree and it seeks to represent a 
wide range of stakeholders （Colasse and Pochet, 
2009）. Unlike the IASB, it gives particular consider-
ation to industry specific interests; it also includes 
the representation of trade unions and the State, 
and last it ensure the relationship with neighboring 
regulations （tax and commercial law） by the repre-
sentation of higher courts.
　This structure provides to the ANC a strong po-
litical legitimacy, since the main stakeholders can 
express their views on the standards early in the 
standard setting process （Colasse, 2005）.
III　Representation of Stakeholders in the 
Japanese Standard Setter
1　About the ASBJ
　The ASBJ is a private standard setting body, fi-
nanced by the Financial Accounting Standards 
Foundation, which is technically the same model 
as the FASB and the IASB. It was created in 2001 
with the support of the Keidanren （Japan Business 
Federation）, the Japanese Institute of Certified Pub-
lic Accountants （JICPA） and the Financial Services 
Agency11 . Financing sources are mainly private 
contributors including large companies and audit 
firms, but the FSA also contributes to its budget.
　The structure of the FASF/ASBJ is more com-
plex than the French ANC.
　The main body of the FASF is the board of direc-
tors, appointed by the councilors12 . FASF direc-
tors appoint ASBJ board members, standards advi-
sory council board members, and also manage the 
foundation （FASF, 2001, p.5）. ASBJ board members 
develop and vote new accounting standards and in-
terpretations, with the assistance of some technical 
committees. The standards advisory council sug-
gests the relative priority of themes to be deliberat-
ed （FASF, 2001, p.14）.
　A particularity of the Japanese standard setting 
process is that a majority of three fifths of board 
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members is required when voting the standards 
（FASF, 2001, p.11）.
　In the case of the ASBJ, there is no official repre-
sentation. For this reason, investigating the possi-
bility of informal representation requires a detailed 
analysis of the composition of the different bodies 
involved. Their members can be classified in four 
categories depending on their professional back-
ground: preparers, users, intermediaries and aca-
demics13.
　The category “preparers” includes accounting 
specialists working in private companies, “academ-
ics”, law and accounting professors, “intermediar-
ies”, certified public accountants. “Users” are de-
fined in a broad sense, including analysts from the 
Banking and Insurance sectors as well as the To-
kyo Stock Exchange. This classification appears to 
be valid in the context of the ASBJ, but it may be 
difficult to generalize to other contexts. For exam-
ple, in the ANC, banking and insurance representa-
tives are legitimate in a preparersʼ viewpoint be-
cause of sectorial particularities.
　In the analysis below, these four categories are 
used to describe the composition of the different 
bodies of the FASF/ASBJ
2　Composition of the FASF/ASBJ
ASBJ board members
　As far as board members are concerned, the 
composition is relatively balanced between prepar-
ers, users, intermediaries and academics （S. Saito, 
interview, 2006）. Based on the same data in 2003, 
we can remark that although most members have 
changed, the overall composition is completely sta-
ble.
FASF Board of Directors
　A similar classification can be made for the 
board of directors, with more types of interested 
par ties represented. Compared with 2003, the 
composition is relatively stable in time. The num-
ber of members has risen from 15 to 20: 3 academ-
ics, a representative of risk insurance （only life in-
surance was present before） and a full-time manager 
Report to
Advisory
Councillors
?Chairman: Koichi 
Masuda?
<13>
Board of Directors
?President: Toshitaka 
Hagiwara?
?Managing Director: 
Hideo Takahashi?
<20>
Auditors
<2>
Accounting Standards 
Board of Japan
?Chairman: Ikuo Nishikawa?
?Vice-chair: Atsushi Kato?
?Vice-chair: Takehiro Arai?
?Full-time Board member: Masaji 
Miyako?
?Full-time Board member: 
Yoshihiro Nomura?
<12 board members, including 5 
full-time members>
<29 research technicals>
Standards Advisory Council
?Chairman: Kunio Nozaki?
?Vice-chair: Seno Tezuka?
<17>
Other Committees
Secretariat
General Affairs Dept. / Planning Dept. / Disclosure Dept.
Technical Committees
?there are 11 committees?
Source: FASF （https://www.asb.or.jp/asb/asb_e/fasf/organization.jsp）
Members of the Board （ASBJ）
Category Profession Number
Preparers Enterprise 3
Users Tokyo Stock Exchange 1
Bank association 1
Investment bank 1
Insurance 1
Intermediaries CPA 3
Academics Accounting 1
Law 1
Total 12
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been gained by insurers to the expense of enter-
prises and academics.
3　Informal but Stable Representation in the 
ASBJ
　To conclude, the findings above show that the 
different bodies forming the FASF/ASBJ offer a 
balanced number of seats to the four categories of 
professionals represented. CPAs, preparers, users 
and academics appear to share equally the authori-
ty of standard setting in accounting.
　The origin of the partnership can be found at the 
creation of the ASBJ, when the Keidanren, the 
FSA, the JICPA and several other institutions gath-
ered to create and finance the new standard setter. 
Since then, the structure of the ASBJ has been re-
formed several times, but the power balance is not 
fundamentally changed despite such important 
events as J-SOX14, ups and downs in the interna-
tional convergence process, or the financial crisis.
　The observation is reinforced by the fact that 
the repartition is stable over a ten year period 
（2003-2012）, which tends to confirms the informal 
stakeholdersʼ representation. The theory is also 
supported by S. Saitoʼs interview （2006）, in which 
the former chairman pointed out the fair reparti-
tion of seats among the four categories.
IV　Informal Representation, Official 
Representation and their Role
1　Who is Represented?
　Findings reveal that interested parties repre-
sented in the standard setting process in Japan and 
in France are very different: a first point to discuss 
is the range of stakeholders that can participate di-
rectly to the standard setting process, and a second 
point is the place of the State.
　As far as users are concerned, the ASBJ places 
more emphasis on institutional investors, while the 
ANC privileges employees. Both particularities are 
consistent with differences in the economic and le-
gal backgrounds. On the one hand, stock exchang-
es in Japan are larger and developed earlier than in 
France, explaining the importance of Banks and 
Board of Directors （FASF）
Category Profession Number
Preparers Enterprise 4
Chamber of commerce 1
Keidanren 1
Users Tokyo Stock Exchange 1
Bank association 1
Investment bank 1
Insurance 3
Intermediaries CPA 3
Academics 
and others
Full-time manager 1
Accounting 3
Law 1
Total 20
Standards Advisory Council
Category Profession Number
Preparers Enterprise 5
Users Tokyo Stock Exchange 1
Bank association 1
Investment bank 1
Insurance 2
Financial analyst 1
Intermediaries CPA 3
Academics Accounting 3
Total 17
Councilors （FASF）
Category Profession Number
Preparers Enterprise 5
Users Tokyo Stock Exchange 1
Bank 1
Intermediaries CPA 3
Academics
and others
Accounting 1
Law 1
Attorney 1
Total 13
have been added. Yet, the repartition of members 
in different socio-professional categories is globally 
stable.
Councilors （FASF）
　As far as the socio-professional origin of council-
ors is concerned, the weight of industry has in-
creased over the period 2003-2012 to the detriment 
of academics. Other parties kept the same number 
of councilors.
Standards Advisory Council
　Last, the Standards Advisory Council of the 
ASBJ is also composed of various stakeholders 
from preparers to users, academics and the ac-
counting profession. From 2003, a similar composi-
tion can be observed, except that two seats have 
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other institutional investors.
　On the other hand, for employees, both coun-
tries have very protective legislations, but France 
has a long tradition of external reporting to trade 
unions. For this reasons, employeesʼ representa-
tives have been associated to accounting standard 
setting all over the post-war period.
　The influence of industries and the Keidanren is 
also more impor tant in Japan than in France, 
where the accounting profession tends to have 
more weight. Given that the Keidanren was a ma-
jor supporter at the creation of the ASBJ in 2001 
（with the FSA）, the large number of corporate offi-
cers is not surprising.
　In France, the accounting profession has never 
been, historically, a dominant actor in accounting 
regulation15, but the paradox can be explained by 
the existence of two professional bodies: the Order 
of Certified Accountants （Ordre des experts compta-
bles） and the National Institute of Auditors （Com-
pagnie nationale des commissaires aux comptes）.
　As far as the State is concerned, it is interesting 
to notice that it is not officially represented in the 
ASBJ although the FSA was one of the core mem-
bers that founded the ASBJ. Moreover, the prede-
cessor of the ASBJ, the BADC, is an advisory body 
of the FSA. In France, the State still plays an im-
portant role in the ANC despite the gradual separa-
tion from public authority since the 1990s （Colasse 
and Standish, 1998）.
　Prior research about standard setting in Japan 
has shown that the role played by the administra-
tion was important （McKinnon, 1986）, but this was 
much before the creation of the ASBJ. Further re-
search about the role of the FSA in modern stan-
dard setting appears to be necessary to understand 
modern standard setting in Japan. Unfortunately, it 
cannot be achieved based on the research method 
used in this study.
2　What is the Role of this Representation?
　Some characteristics of the ASBJ combined with 
background information about the Japanese stan-
dard setting process suggest that the framework of 
Colasse （2005） about representative bodies is valid 
in the Japanese case as well as in the French case.
　First, the representation of stakeholders allows 
them to exchange information and discuss new 
standards early in the standard setting process. 
For example, they can discuss an accounting treat-
ment before the first exposure draft is published 
for comments. Giving stakeholders the opportunity 
to participate to the debates allows a better under-
standing between interested par ties （Colasse, 
2005）.
　The second common point of the Japanese and 
French standard setting process is the pursuit of a 
consensus. In the ASBJ, a majority of three fifths is 
required to adopt a new standard, but in fact, most 
standards are discussed until a consensus is 
reached between the board members （S. Saito, in-
terview, 2006）. The same characteristic is described 
in Colasse （2005） that qualifies the French stan-
dard setting process as “standard setting by the 
speech”. The author analyzes that new standards 
are discussed until all parties agree, which is only 
made possible by the representative structure of 
the ANC.
Conclusion
　The purpose of this study was not to explain the 
differences of socio-professional categories repre-
sented in standard setting, but rather to show the 
importance of representation for the standard set-
ter. As a matter of fact, independent “technocratic” 
standard setting bodies face legitimacy issues be-
cause they lack the political support of related par-
ties. Meanwhile, representative bodies have fewer 
problems to have their standards accepted because 
they allow stakeholders to express their opinions 
directly in the standard setting process （Colasse, 
2005）.
　In this study, I have investigated the representa-
tion of stakeholders in two cases: the ANC in 
France, and the ASBJ in Japan.
　As far as the French ANC is concerned, the tra-
dition of representation described by Colasse 
（2005） remains despite the reform in 2007 that re-
duced the number of board members （Colasse and 
Pochet, 2009）. This representation is important in 
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the French context because financial accounting is 
embedded is commercial, fiscal and social law; for 
this reason, both public and private stakeholders 
need to be represented in the standard setting proc-
ess.
　On the contrary, the Japanese ASBJ has no offi-
cial tradition of stakeholdersʼ representation, but a 
careful analysis reveals that four categories of pro-
fessionals share the seats of the standard setter: 
preparers, users, the accounting profession, and 
academics. The repartition is balanced and stable 
over a ten-year period, which suggests the exis-
tence of an informal representation of these stake-
holders.
　Representation in standard setting appears to be 
favorable to the pursuit of consensus between 
stakeholders. As a matter of fact, it provides the 
opportunity for interested parties to discuss direct-
ly the project and share information before the 
standard is elaborated. This role has been defined 
in Colasse （2005）, and the Japanese case provides 
an interesting application for this theory.
　To conclude on the findings of this study, allow-
ing stakeholders to discuss directly projects of 
standards is a source of political legitimacy for the 
French and the Japanese standard setters. This 
can be achieved thanks to the representative struc-
ture of both bodies.
Notes　　　　　　　
1　This point was raised several times in the G20 meetings 
in 2009.
2　Both countries have delayed the adoption of IFRS.
3　For example the Securities Exchange Commission
（SEC） in the US, the Financial Services Agency （FSA） in 
Japan, or competent ministries in other countries.
4　Financial Accounting Standards Board.
5　Colasse （2005） and Burlaud and Colasse （2010） argue 
that these specialists cannot be completely independent 
since they belong to socio-economic groups that have 
vested interests in accounting standard setting. Even the 
accounting profession, which supplies accounting servic-
es when a new standard is implemented, is not seen as a 
neutral actor.
6　“technocratic” as defined by Colasse （2005）.
7　In the IASB, the majority of members are former ac-
countants with international backgrounds.
8　This is the typical form of accounting standards in com-
mon law countries, whereas “hard law” usually corre-
sponds to code law systems.
9　The categories of stakeholders represented in standard 
setting appear to differ greatly depending on the country.
10　The Business Advisory Deliberation Council（BADC）, 
a consultative body under the supervision of the Financial 
Services Agency, still exists and is a public standard set-
ting body.
11　Interview with S. Saito, December 2006.
12　Councilors are themselves appointed by directors 
（FASF, 2001, p.9）. According to S. Saito, when a trustee 　
quits, his successor is appointed after consultation of the 
organization to which the predecessor belonged.
13　For the purpose of the classifications below, the defini-
tion of categories and their role have been discussed in an 
interview with the Chairman of the ASBJ, S. Saito in De-
cember 2006.
14　Japanese version of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
15　French accounting regulation has been dominated by 
tax since the spreading of income tax in the 1920s.
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